Increased turnover among legislators can make them short-sighted, affecting fiscal policy and economic growth. We exploit the exogenous variation in legislative turnover induced by term limit laws and by redistricting in the fifty U.S. states, finding that increased turnover increases capital spending by state governments, which may be designed to constrain future governments. The changes may cause long-run distortions in the economy, reducing long-term economic growth.
Introduction
This paper examines how legislative turnover affects government fiscal policy and growth in the fifty U.S. states over the years . The decline in turnover over time in the U.S. is studied by many authors (see, for example, Rosenthal 1974 , Shin and Jackson 1979 , Niemi and Winsky 1987 , and Moncrief et al. 2004 . Also well studied is how policy outcomes affect electoral outcomes, such as the likelihood of reelection and turnover (see Chubb 1988 , Besley and Case 1995 , Brender 2003 , Brender and Drazen 2008 . In contrast to such work, we use turnover as an explanatory variable which can affect policy.
A methodological issue is that turnover may be endogenous. For example, voters may more likely re-elect legislators in states with more favorable spending policies. These voters' preferences are unobservable, leading to an omitted variable bias in the estimated effect of turnover on policy. We address the problem by using quasi-experimental variation in turnover generated by state term limit provisions and by redistricting. In the 1990s many states adopted limits on the number of terms legislators could serve, causing legislative turnover to increase dramatically in term-limited states compared to non-term-limited states. The average rates of turnover for the two types of states are plotted in Figure 1 . Until the mid-1990s the rate of turnover is similar in the two sets of states. In the mid-1990s, however, when term limits started taking effect in many states, the rate of turnover in term-limited states increased dramatically compared to the non-term-limited states. Furthermore, Figure 1 suggests that legislative turnover is generally higher in years immediately following the implementation of decennial redistricting plans than in other years. We use two instrument variables to identify the exogenous variation in legislative turnover. These instruments are indicator variables for the years in which term limit laws took effect and onwards, and the years in which states implemented their redistricting plans.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 discusses the historical pattern of turnover in the U.S. Section 4 explains the empirical method and describes the data. Section 5 presents the results, and Section 6 concludes.
Literature
Turnover can affect policy in several ways. Infrequent turnover and long tenure of elected officials can entrench them and establish a culture of spending (Payne 1991 , Hibbing 1991 . Longer tenure of elected officials can strengthen their hold on office and allows them to collude with other officials to increase spending on programs they favor (Adam and Kenny 1986) . A longer tenure also allows an incumbent to accumulate brand-name capital, which dissuades [potential challengers and allows incumbents to shirk (Lott 1986 (Lott , 1987 .
But short tenures or high turnover have their disadvantages. High turnover can be costly to the electorate by substituting inexperienced politicians for experienced ones (Adams and Kenny 1986) , and by weakening reelection constraints (Crain 1977) . High turnover could force incumbents to extract maximum rent today. The higher extraction relates to the "stationary bandit" theory (see McGuire and Olson 1996) , which argues that an incumbent who expects to stay in power for a long time benefits from economic growth because it allows him to collect more tax revenue. Evidence for such an effect is given by Bejar, Mukherjee, and Will (2011) , who find that a coalition government will spend more the greater the hazard rate that the coalition will fall. Additionally, an increase in the hazard rate of coalition governments by one standard deviation above its mean reduces the rate of economic growth by 1.5 percent.
Commitment to a policy may be difficult when turnover is high 1 In the absence of credible commitments, an incumbent government may use debt to influence the policies of a successor whose policy preferences are different (Alesina and Tabellini 1990) . 2 Furthermore, a conservative government may accumulate more debt when it expects to be replaced by a liberal government than when it expects to stay in power (Persson and Svensson 1989) . Indeed, empirical work finds that the volatility of fiscal policy increases with legislative turnover (Crain and Tollison 1993) . Though aggregate fiscal variables (such as total spending, taxes, and public debt) are commonly studied in the literature, the composition rather than only the aggregate values of these variables can be important. The nature of these compositional effects is unclear. Some evidence suggests that imperfect commitments between current and future majorities encourage public consumption over public investment (Leblanc et al. 2000) . The evidence also shows that legislative turnover in states in India distorts government expenditures: high turnover increases the size of government and increases public consumption at the expense of public investment, reflecting legislators who are more shortsighted (Uppal 2011) .
On the other hand, voters or legislators who fear losing power may favor durable, capital-intensive, projects over more efficient, smaller, projects, intending to constrain the policy set of future governments. A current legislature that wishes to restrict a future legislature, or to ensure the provision of some services in the future can adopt several policies. One is to spend on capital projects. For example, construction of a rail line, which cannot be easily changed, can do more to ensure transportation service to some destination than would subsidies to a bus line, which subsidies can later be changed (see Glazer (1989) and Glazer and Rothenberg (2001) ). Another, related, approach is to commit future spending. Capital projects that will require spending in the future (think of a university which constructs a building which will require maintenance and air conditioning) restrict what government will spend on other services. And if capital projects are financed by bonds, the requirement to finance the bond payments can also restrict 2 Other effects can also appear. A legislator who fears losing office may favor policies which, in the long run, may increase his electoral prospects. For example, he may favor inefficient policies which induce voters who oppose his policies to move elsewhere (Glaeser and Shleifer 2005, and Brueckner and Glazer 2008). future governments. Furthermore, such restrictions may limit the ability of government to respond to new needs, which can reduce economic growth. Some empirical evidence supports these ideas. State governments in India manipulate fiscal policy in the form of tax breaks for some producers and higher spending on public investment projects around elections (Khemani 2004) . Investment increases and some components of current spending decline in Columbian municipalities during election years (Drazen and Eslava 2010) .
A related question is how a change in government affects policy. A study of 71 democracies over finds that the replacement of a leader does not significantly affect expenditure composition in the short run, and generates only small changes after four years, mostly in developed countries (Brender and Drazen 2009) . Within states in the U.S., a change in who is governor may change policy: Bunce (1981) finds that who rules makes a difference, but reanalysis of Bunce's data by Brunk and Minehart (1984) casts doubt on that. The issue studied below is not what happens immediately after a change, but instead the effects of the frequency of change. For example, the effects of a change in leadership may differ when changes are common than when changes are rare.
Our work complements studies of political competition. One argument is that competition results in efficient policymaking (Stigler 1972 , Wittman 1989 , with some evidence supporting that idea: low competition in the U.S. states leads to higher taxes, lower capital spending, lower likelihood of right-to-work laws, and weaker economic growth (Besley and Case 2003, and Besley, Persson, and Sturm 2010) . Political competition, however, may induce excessive rent-seeking and result in inefficient policy (Tullock 1967 , Krueger 1974 , McCormick et al. 1984 , Polo 1998 , Svensson 1998 , Lizzeri and Persico 2005 . Like Besley, Persson, and Sturm (2010) , we find that turnover increases capital spending. But whereas Besley, Persson, and Sturm (2010) find that increased competition increases economic growth, we find that increased turnover reduces growth.
Historical patterns of turnover
Limited turnover and long legislative tenures are common in the United States. The pattern holds for legislatures both at the federal and state levels. Legislative careers, however, were not always long. Turnover in state legislatures during 1925-35 was high; on average, over half of the legislators were first-time members, and only a handful of legislators served more than three or four terms. Election defeats were only partially responsible for this turnover, with inadequate compensation an important factor in voluntary retirements (Hyneman 1938a and 1938b) .
Turnover in U.S. states began to decline steadily after the 1930s. It dropped from about 50% during 1931 -40 to about 35% during 1971 -76 (Shin and Jackson 1979 . It further declined to below 25% in the late 1970s and 1980s (Niemi and Winsky 1987) . The overall decline hides much variation among states and across legislative chambers. Some southern states such as Alabama, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Louisiana, and a few nonsouthern states such as Maine and Maryland had consistently high rates of turnover, whereas some urban, industrial, states such as New York, California, Illinois, and Massachusetts showed consistently lower rates of turnover (Shin and Jackson 1979) . Turnover is generally lower in upper chambers than in lower chambers, in chambers with staggered terms (Shin and Jackson 1979) , and in single-member districts than in multi-member districts (Niemi and Winsky 1987) .
Factors that affected turnover include frequency of elections, reapportionment, the size of the chamber, the length of a legislative session, and professionalism of legislatures (Rosenthal 1974) . Components of legislative compensation that affected turnover include bureaucratic resources available to incumbents (Fiorina 1977) , operating budgets available to legislators (Berry, Berkman and Schneiderman 2000) , and salary (Carey, Neimi, and Powell 2000) .
The decline in turnover and the resultant lengthening of legislative careers has raised concerns about too many career politicians and too little "fresh blood," about legislatures unresponsive to changing public interests, and about legislatures unrepresentative of the population (Nye, Zelikow, and King 1997, Patterson and Magleby 1992) .
Limits on the number of terms legislators could serve were enacted by 21 states starting in the 1990s. 3 
Method and Data
We estimate the following empirical model: The explanatory variable of greatest interest here is legislative turnover, Turnover it , defined as the percentage of new legislators in state i in election year t. This measure of turnover reflects the simple probability that a legislator will not serve in the next term of a legislature. The turnover data we use were collected by Moncrief, Niemi and Powell (2008) , who compare legislative membership at the beginning of the session immediately after the election in year t with membership immediately after the election, in year t + 1. Because general elections for state legislatures are commonly held in November, turnover observed in an election year is assumed to affect fiscal policy next year. And because turnover is only observed for election years, it is assumed to be constant between any two elections. The most recent observed value of turnover is assumed to estimate the rate of turnover for a current legislator. Because all states but Nebraska have bicameral legislatures, we use the simple average of turnover rates in the two legislative chambers in each state as our measure of turnover.
The vector X it consists of various economic, demographic, and political control variables. The economic and demographic variables are the natural logarithm of state personal income per capita, the natural logarithm of state population, the proportion of the population that is black, and the proportion of the population aged 65 and over. Political factors are also used as controls. The preferences of the majority party in a legislature, and hence party control of a legislature, may affect public policy (Garand 1988 , Alt and Lowry 1994 , Rogers and Rogers 2000 , Besley and Case 2003 . For example, Democratic control of the House is associated with higher government spending (Alt and Lowry 1994, and Rogers and Rogers 2000) . Democratic control of a legislature is associated with significantly higher taxes and a redistribution of spending in favor of family assistance (Besley and Case 2003) . Accordingly, we control for the strength of the majority party in each chamber: the variable Democratic Legislature is 1 if the Democratic party controls both the state house and senate; Republican Legislature is 1 if the Republican party controls both the state house and senate. Divided control of the state government also affects policy (Alt and Lowry 1994 , 2000 , and Besley and Case 2003 ; for example, divided government leads to larger deficits (Alt and Lowry 1994). We create a dummy variable, Divided, which is 1 if different parties control the House, Senate, and the governorship; the variable is 0 if a single party controls the state government. The control for term limits on governors is a dummy variable, set to 1 if the governor is term-limited and set to 0 otherwise.
The data on state personal income and population come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The data on proportion of black population, proportion aged 65 and over, the majority party in the legislature, and the party of the governor up to 2000 come from Leigh (2008).
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A methodological problem arises if turnover is endogenous. For example, voters may more likely re-elect legislators in states with more favorable spending policy. Inclusion of state and time fixed effects would resolve the problem of endogeneity if omitted voters' preferences remain invariant over time, or change in a common fashion across states. But voters' preferences likely change over time. Also, common changes across states are unlikely if state-specific shocks affect voters' preferences over time. To identify the effect of turnover on policy variables, we use an instrument variable (IV) method.
We use the following instruments for the rate of turnover: term limit provisions in various states (discussed above), and years in which states redistrict. We shall first discuss the term limits instrument, and then the redistricting instrument.
The term-limit instruments are two dummy variables (one each for state House and Senate), each taking a value of 1 for the year term limits became effective in a particular chamber in that state and after, and 0 otherwise. A justification for using these instrumental variables is that term limit laws vary in their restrictiveness across states, and take effect in different years across states and in each chamber within a state.
A valid instrument must fulfill two important conditions. First, it should correlate highly with legislative turnover, which indeed holds for term limits. As discussed above, average turnover jumps dramatically in termlimited states when the term limit laws take effect starting in the mid-1990s (see Figure 1) , implying a strong correlation between term limit laws and turnover. As shown in Table 2 , average turnover is much higher in term-limited states than in non-term-limited states, and the difference is statistically significant. Turnover is also affected by redistricting (see Moncrief, Niemi and Powell 2008) . As seen in Figure 1 , average turnover over the period 1980-2007 increases following the decennial redistricting. And Table  2 suggests that average turnover in redistricted years is significantly higher than in non-redistricted years. Lending further support for our instruments, the first-stage F-statistics checking for the strength of the instruments are much higher than the critical values suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997) .
Second, a valid instrument must not directly correlate with the policy variables, though it could affect policy indirectly through turnover. This exclusion restriction means that the instrument is included in the turnover equation, but excluded from the equation which has a policy variable on the left-hand side. Our instruments appear to satisfy this condition. First, the over-identification tests consistently do not reject the hypotheses that the instruments are excluded from the policy equation. Second, as explained next, the instrumental variables appear to be exogenous.
States having the lowest turnover rates are not especially likely to adopt term limits. As seen in Figure 1 , the plots of average turnover in both term-limited and non-term-limited states are similar before the mid-1990s, suggesting that the term limit laws were not a response to lower turnover in term-limited states. Ansolabehere and Snyder (2004) , who use term limit laws in the U.S. states to instrument for strategic retirements by legislators, conclude that term-limited states are comparable to non-term-limited states on many dimensions. Mooney (2009) also provides evidence that term-limited states are comparable to non-term-limited states on various demographic, economic and political variables. The redistricting instrument is an indicator variable for the year in which 9 In one respect, states with term limits differ from states without term limits. All states with term limits, excepting Louisiana, allow voter initiatives to reform their state constitution. Though states with voter initiatives may plausibly differ systematically from states without such initiatives, the evidence does not support such a conclusion. First, many states passed laws allowing voter initiatives almost a century ago (Matsusaka 1995). Second, Smith and Fridkin (2008) argue that the factors that were associated with term limits were transitory. a state adopted its final redistricting plan. The redistricting can increase turnover, but need not affect policy in a particular direction. The use of redistricting as an instrument raises a similar concern about the exogeneity of the indicator variables for the year in which the final decennial redistricting plan is implemented. Nevertheless, others have used redistricting as an instrument. Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart (2000) so use it when estimating the incumbency advantage in the U.S. House elections. We also draw upon Besley and Case (2003) who suggest using term limits and redistricting as major institutional changes for dealing with endogeneity of political factors. And to address the possibility that political parties create safe districts for themselves, we include indicator variables for partisan controls of legislatures.
We end this section with Table 3 , which compares means and standard deviations for all the variables for the whole sample, term-limited and nonterm-limited states, and years of election after redistricting and otherwise.
Results

Legislative turnover and fiscal policy
In all the regressions on spending and taxes reported below, turnover increases capital spending, current spending, and tax revenue. The statistically significant effects, however, are limited to capital spending. All regressions are estimated using fixed effect (FE) estimator. Additionally, all regressions include year fixed effects and regional dummies interacted with time. Results from the IV estimation are in Table 4 .
In these regressions and the ones described below, we tested for serial correlation in the error terms by using the Arellano-Bond test and rejected the null hypothesis of no serial correlation (See Arellano and Bond 1991, Roodman 2006) . 10 We therefore cluster the standard errors at the state level to account for arbitrary within state serial correlation in spending or taxes.
In column (1), the dependent variable is total state government spending as a share of personal income. The coefficient on turnover is positive, but is statistically insignificant. Turning to the composition of spending, theory suggests that higher turnover can have opposing effects on capital spending. A legislator facing high turnover may care little about future services, and so favor current spending over capital spending. But a legislator who expects to leave office soon may want to commit future policy, and so favor capitalintensive, durable, projects (see Glazer 1989) . Empirically, turnover has a positive, albeit statistically insignificant, effect on current spending as a percent of income in column (2). The effect of turnover on capital spending as a percent of state income is shown in column (3). The effect is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. The evidence is thus consistent with the commitment hypothesis. Substantively, an increase in turnover by about 25 percentage points, which is the typical increase in term-limited states with lifetime term limits over the sample period, results in about a 0.2 percentage points increase in the share of capital spending, compared to the sample average share of about 1% of state income. In column (4), the effect of turnover on tax revenues is insignificant.
The instruments we use appear not to suffer from weakness: as discussed above, average turnover rates differ significantly between states with and without term limits, and between years in which final redistricted plans were and were not implemented. A formal test for weak instruments, based on the proportion of variation in the endogenous variable explained by the instruments in the first stage, is given by Staiger and Stock (1997) and Kleibergen and Paap (2006) . A cutoff value of 10 is recommended for the first-stage F-statistic, below which the instruments may be weak (Staiger and Stock 1997, and Baum, Schaffer and Stillman 2006) . The values of the first-stage F-statistic (Kleibergen-Paap rk statistic) in the specification used in Table 4 is 20.98, implying that our instruments strongly identify the variation in turnover rates.
The validity of over-identifying restrictions can be examined using the Hansen J test. The null hypothesis states that our instruments are properly excluded from the model. Thus, a high value of the test statistic would lead to a rejection of over-identifying restrictions and imply that the instruments are directly related to the error term in our model. The p-values of the test statistics from this regression, given in Table 4 , are higher than the conventionally used levels of significance. The null hypothesis that the instruments are valid is not rejected.
Partisan effects
Fiscal policy can differ under different political parties in power. The majority party may push for levels of government spending that accord with its ideology. Also, the partisan effects on policy may differ depending on whether one party controls only the legislature, or the governorship, or both. Such partisan effects are studied in this subsection. Added to our basic specification is an indicator variable ( Democratic Legislature) set to 1 if a legislature is controlled by the Democratic party and 0 otherwise, and an indicator variable (Republican Legislature) set to 1 if a legislature is controlled by the Republican party and 0 otherwise. The excluded category is divided control of a legislature. We also include an indicator variable (Divided) which is 1 if control of the legislature and the governorship is divided and is 0 if a single party controls both the legislature and the governorship, and another indicator variable for whether the governor cannot stand for reelection.
Examining partisan effects is also useful because it may tell us whether the legislature can control outcomes. For example, if spending is higher under Democrats than under Republicans, then it appears that the legislature can affect spending. If we find that turnover does not affect spending, then that is not because the legislature is powerless.
We report the results after controlling for partisan and other political variables in columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) of Table 5 . The effect of turnover on total spending or its composition is similar to the findings above. Turnover does not significantly affect the share of total spending, but increased turnover increases the share of capital outlays significantly. Partisan variables do not significantly affect total spending or its composition; as we shall see below, they do affect tax policy. The coefficient on gubernatorial term limits is significant at the 10% level in column (5), suggesting that governors in their last terms may increase capital spending. That too is consistent with the commitment hypothesis. In column (7), though turnover does not significantly affect tax revenues, party control of a legislature affects taxes significantly. The coefficient on Democratic legislature is positive, implying that taxes are higher under a Democratic legislature than under a divided legislature. A Republican legislature, in contrast, has significantly lower taxes than a divided legislature; the share of taxes is about 0.3% less. This result is consistent with results by Rogers and Rogers (2000) and Besley and Case (2003) , who find significant partisan effects on fiscal policy.
A further examination of partisan effects considers interactions with turnover: a legislature with a Democratic majority may behave differently from a legislature with a Republican majority when faced with high turnover. In columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) of Table 5 we interact turnover with indicator variables for a legislature with Democratic control (Democratic Legislature) and a legislature with Republican control (Republican Legislature) to examine if the effect of turnover differs by partisan control of legislatures. Because the two interaction variables are additional endogenous variables, the IV estimation in these columns uses the following additional instruments: the indicator variable for term limits in a state Senate interacted with Democratic Legislature; the indicator variable for term limits in a state Senate interacted with Republican Legislature; the indicator variable for term limits in state House interacted with Democratic Legislature; and the indicator variable for term limits in state Senate interacted with Republican Legislature. In column (2), a Democratic legislature has significantly lower spending compared to a divided legislature. High turnover is associated more strongly with higher spending when the Democratic party controls both houses of the legislature.
Consider next the composition of spending. In columns (4) and (6), under a Democratic legislature compared to a divided legislature, current spend-ing is significantly lower, whereas capital spending is the same. The effect of turnover on current spending is significantly larger under a Democratic legislature than under a divided legislature. The interaction variables do not significantly affect taxes, except in column (8) where a Democratic legislature increases taxes more when faced with higher turnover. Taken together, these results indicate that though Republican legislatures do not behave differently from Democratic legislatures, turnover affects policy more when a single party controls the legislature compared to when the control is divided. A note of caution about the results with interaction variables in this table, as the first-stage F-statistic is small, the augmented set of instrumental variables has a weak relationship with the interacted endogenous variables.
Robustness Checks
The above results use a simple average of turnover in state Senate and House to measure turnover. An alternative measure is a weighted average of turnover in both chambers. We do so by using members turned over as a percentage of the total membership of a legislature (Senate and House combined). We call this measure the aggregate turnover. The results, shown in Table 6 , are consistent with our findings above. Increased turnover significantly increases capital spending in column (3). Additionally, increased turnover increases tax revenues significantly in column (4).
Another hypothesis is that term limits affect other legislative characteristics, such as reducing average experience. Kurtz, Cain, and Niemi (2007) extensively analyze the years after term limits became effective, demonstrating that term limits have not brought about most of the expected changes in legislative composition, such as increased representation of women or minorities. But by definition, term limits will affect average legislative experience. We include as an additional explanatory variable average political experience, measured by the average number of previous years served by a legislator in a state (a widely used measure of legislative experience). Policy may also be affected by political competition. One empirical finding is that tighter gubernatorial races produce less governmental spending (Rogers and Rogers 2000) . Large electoral majorities in the U.S. states lead to higher taxes, lower capital spending, lower likelihood of right-to-work laws, and weaker economic growth (Besley and Case 2003, and Besley, Persson, and Sturm 2010) . These findings contrast with the effects of turnover, an aspect of political competition, discussed above. To make sense of our results in light of the existing literature, we include a direct measure of political competition in our regression model. This measure of competition, based on Besley and Case (2003) , is computed as follows:
where DHOUSE it is the Democratic share of seats in a state's lower house, and DSENATE it is the Democratic share of seats in a state's upper house. The larger the value of POLCOMP it , the closer are the party strengths in a legislature, and so the more intense the competition. We examine the effects of political experience and political competition in Table 7 . The coefficients on political experience or political competition are insignificant; the effect of turnover on capital spending remains largely unchanged and is significant at the 10% level.
In Table 8 , we check for a non-linear effect of turnover. We create three dummy variables: turnover >= 45 indicates if the turnover rate is greater than or equal to 45%; 30 <= turnover < 45 indicates if the turnover rate is greater than or equal to 30% but less than 45%; and 15 <= turnover < 30 indicates if the turnover rate lies between 15% and 30%. The excluded category is turnover less than 15%. The aggregate policy variables, namely the share of expenditure in column (1), and tax revenue as a share of income in column (7), show some non-linearities with respect to turnover. Spending is only slightly lower for extreme values of turnover. The share of taxes in income, however, shows no decline even at higher levels of turnover. These results suggest that high turnover little disciplines legislators. No significant non-linearities are found in the disaggregated variables. We also examine the interesting question of when the effects of increased turnover appearin anticipation of increased turnover, only after a long lag after term limits are imposed, and so on. We explore the question in columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) of Table 8 by estimating regressions in which we interact average turnover with the lags and leads of term limits in the state House. 11 We find that capital spending increased in the year or two before term limits, which increased turnover, became effective. The finding suggests that legislators anticipated the increased turnover, and attempted to constrain decisions of future legislatures. The result also suggests that the effect of increased turnover does not appear solely because increased turnover reduces political experience-some of the increase in capital spending appeared before turnover increased. Lastly, the regression estimates show that the effect of turnover on capital spending declined over time. The decline of capital spending over time may arise because the best projects are adopted first, which causes a decline in opportunities for capital spending. In Table 9 , we convert the data into four-year averages. The results are consistent with what we find above. In Table 10 we first-difference all the variables to control for any state-specific time trends. An additional advantage of considering differenced variables is to alternatively control for serially-correlated standard errors. 12 The findings, however, remain the same as above. The changes in turnover are significantly related to changes in either total or capital spending.
Economic growth
Increased turnover is most consistently associated with increased spending on capital projects, which may be designed to constrain the policy choices of future office holders, whose policy preferences the incumbents may dislike. Such induced inefficiency in fiscal policy may reduce long-run economic growth. Moreover, the theory of "stationary bandits," described above, 11 We also interact lags and leads of a dummy variable for term limits in the state Senate and get similar results. 12 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
suggests that legislators who may soon leave office care less about future economic growth than do legislators who expect to remain long in office.
We test for such effects by measuring long-run growth in each state with a five-year moving average of the annual rate of growth of personal income in column (1) in Table 11 . Increased turnover reduces the long-run rate of growth. The coefficient on turnover is significant at the 10% level. Substantively, an increase in turnover by about 25 percentage points, which is the typical increase in term-limited states with lifetime term limits over the sample period, results in about an 0.95 percentage points decrease in the long-run growth rate, compared to a sample average of about 2.7%. Growth is significantly lower if the Republican party controls the legislature compared to a divided legislature. Contrary to the finding in Besley and Case (1995) , however, growth is unaffected by gubernatorial term limits. Column (2) measures long-run growth with a ten-year moving average of the annual rate of growth of personal income; the effect of increased turnover on longrun growth rate remains unchanged. The effect of turnover is the same, albeit insignificant, in column (3), where we measure long-run growth with the five-year compound rate of growth. In column (4), increased turnover significantly reduces the long-run rate of growth as measured by the ten-year compound rate of growth.
Columns (1), (4), (7), and (10) in Table 12 report the effect of interaction between turnover and partisan control variables on long-run economic growth. Increased turnover lowers the rate of growth, but the effect of turnover does not differ significantly by which party controls the legislature. In columns (2), (5), (8), and (11), we add political experience as an additional covariate. The effect of turnover stays negative. A more experienced legislature has no significant effect on long-run growth. Lastly, we examine the effect of political competition on growth in columns (3), (6), (9), and (12). Whereas high turnover continues to reduce growth, political competition has a significantly positive effect on long-run growth. One reason can be that whereas some investment is undertaken to increase growth (as Besley, Persson, and Sturm (2010) argue), legislators who fear losing power may favor capital-intensive projects not because the projects will increase growth, but because legislators want to constrain future governments. Not all investment is efficient.
Conclusions
Our study broadly suggests that increased turnover among legislators affects policies, increasing spending on capital projects. Such increased spending is consistent with the idea that legislators who fear losing office aim to constrain future policy. Increased spending on capital projects, that are not easily reversible, is an effective way of committing future policy. This behavior may explain why high turnover is associated with slower long-run economic growth.
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